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Abtract: The main goal of this article is to find an answer for the
question about necessary reform to be undertaken in the EU to save
the euro as a common currency. Author envisages the institutional
reforms in the euro area before futher enlargement to the new member
countries from east and central Europe. The essential element of the
reform is to establish a proper mix between the ECB’ monetary policy
and fiscal policies in the member states. All proposed steps against
euro crisis are mutually collarated: monetary integration requires
stricker fiscal integration, fiscal integration requires banking union but
baniking union is going to to require some form of a political union.
This way the debt crisis in the euro area may present an opportunity to
renewed the strength of European institutions.
Introduction
Finacial crisis have been pervasive phenomenon throughout
history. Bordo et al. ( 2001 ) found that their frequency in recent
decades has been doubled that of the Bretton Wood period. Although
the actual financial crisis started in 2008 and was initially seen as
difficulties in the US subprime mortgage market, rapidly escalated
and spilled over to financial market all over the world. It touched
deeply the members of euro area and changed into economic
depression with growing unemployment and drop of production. The
decrease of production and grow of unemployment was specially
acute in four member countries of euro area :Greece, Portugal, Spain
and Ireland.
Threfore the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a subject to a
challenge by the present economic crises despite of single market
success. It is out of the question that now, that to save the euro in the
long run reform of the EMU are required. During the euro crisis there
are many propositions concerning EMU institutional reforms. The
propositions of reforms are connected directly or indirectly to this the
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fundamental question if the euro area should be less integrated or
more integrated among members; if partners countries will fight the
crisis on their own or in close cooperation with other countries, if the
solution for the euro area is to introduce new mechanism of
integration to go into proper mix between fiscal and monetary policy
or to encourage the most indebted members to exit the euro area ; if
the final model of integration to be achieve is a federalist structure of
governance in the EU like in some federal states?
The main goal of this article is to analyse the possible scenario of
European Monetary Integration ( EMU ) future evolution. The author
tries to answer for the questions what necessary reforms should be
udertaken to get out from the present EMU’ crisis to save the euro as
common money and to introduce it in the new EU partner countries.
He came to the conclusion that the essential elemnets of such reform
will be the coordination between monetary policy of ECB and fiscal
policies in member states.
1. The mechanism of euro area.
The most important of all the potential benefits of monetary
integration are price stability, avoidance of transaction costs, low
interet rates, increassed flows of international trade and capital
movement. Theorists of European integration treat the euro and its
institutional arrangements as means to restrict the ability of national
governments to pursue inflationary monetary policies. The European
Central Bank as a fully independent institution makes monetary policy
with much less political interference than any national central bank. It
is easier for the ECB to fight against inflation collectively than for
individual central bank in the national environments. Long distances
from national capitals reduce the potential pressure of domestic
governments to ease monetary policy based on their political cycles,
that always end up with high interest rates.
While the benefits from membership in the euro area may be
moderate, cumulative and reasonable uncontroversial in the short run,
the costs seems to be much more uncertain in the long run. These
costs are not simply of the cost of the administration changeover from
currency to another. Rather they are related to the loss of country
sovereignty over monetary policy. After accession into the euro area a
member country lose the control over its monetary policy and the
exchange rate mechanism. Other costs for the an economy are
connected with higher openness to trade and international
competition, additionally with the reduction of «marge de manuvere»
and fundamental changes in the formulation of economic policies.
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These costs are difficult to quantify, and their true value may appear
in the long run, especially in light of the current economic crises
underway and necessity to introduce new mechanism against them.
The theory of economic integration assumes that the European
Monetary Integration is needed to safeguard the benefits of the
internal market. Euro unable partner countries to avoid transaction
costs, risk of rate of exchange and large prices discrepenicies. All of
these served development of trade and factor of production between
partne countries and greater economic integration in the single market.
The alternative to the EMU might be floating exchange rates with
frequent realignments that would lead to competitive devaluations and
new trade barriers. Monetary integration has implication for business
transaction, as well as for partner countries economic policy. A
country that joins the euro area will no longer be able to carry out an
independent monetary policy. The growing interdependence of
national economies reduces the effectiveness of member states
economic policies. Unification of monetary policy implies especially
coordination of fiscal policy. Each coordination and unification is
connected with new institutional arrangements and economic benefits
and some costs
Many economists argue that the EU mechanism is not correctly
prepared to fight against crisis. Asymmetric shocks and reallocation of
production from one region to the other happens not only in the EU,
but also in the federal states like the USA. However, in the EU
asymmetric shocks may be more intensive and frequent. The
economic diversity between European regions is much higher in the
EU and euro area than in the US (1 ). After a member states
relinquishes its autonomy over monetary policy, fiscal adjustment
becomes a key stabilizing instrument for partners in a monetary union.
In the federal state there exist automatic stabilizers, that transfer
income from regions with growing production and tax income to
regions with dropping production and income. If one of the states in
the US, for example California defaulted the federally insured
financial system would continue to pay social security and health
benefits. In the US fiscal federalism plays a very important role in
offsetting region specific shocks and able to absorb around 40 % of
them: a loss of 1 dollar to the income of a US region decreases federal
taxes by 34 cents and increase at the same time federal transfer by 6
cent., However, default of one of EU member country would create
much more trouble for the entire union, as it lacks the mechanism of
federal states. There is no automatic mechanism of transferring
Community resources into national budgets. The EU delegates the
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task of fighting against economic downturns to national budgets,
which may be overburdened by deficits and huge national debt. There
is not mechanism of automatic stabilizers similar to that of the federal
state. The EU lacks the competency to levy direct taxes and payments
unemployment benefits. The relative size of common budget is too
small in comparison with the national budget to have any significant
macroeconomic role. While the EU budget collect about 1 % of GDP
of all members’ states, the relation of national budgets towards GDP
are more than 40 %. A shock of one euro in regional GDP of a partner
country reduces tax payments to EU budget by only half a cent, and
transfer to the common budget are able to compensate no more than 1
% of income. The main positions in the EU budget spending:
Structural Funds and Common Agricultural Policy cannot act as
automatic stabilizers. The aim of Structural Funds aim is to reduce
disparities between the levels of development of the various regions
and the backwardness of the least favoured regions. The aids are
allocated on the basis of long term programing periods (now seven
years), that are difficult to change. They may only minimally and
accidently alleviate the asymmetric shocks in the members states. The
Structural Funds act sometimes procyclically due to the coofinance by
national resources. They may also generate, as they have done like in
many Polish voievodship deficit in public finances. As Structural
Funds do not act as automatic stabilizers, it seems that monetary union
should not include too many regions of objective 1 more exposed to
economic crises before reaching certain level of competitiveness. In
order to carry out the functions of automatic stabilizers the UE budget
should have many more resources at its disposition. The hardest hit
regions that surpassed the level of 75 % ( like some Greek, Portugal
and Spanish regions ) are those where structural aids are limited or
have ended. Instead of through EU aids growth in these regions was
financed by national and regional budget deficit and accumulation of
public debts. In general it seems that federal government has better
automatic mechanism to fight against asymmetric shocks then does
the EU, where member countries concentrate their domestic insurance
mechanism on their national budgets, limited additionally by
Maastricht criteria and Pact of Stability and Growth.
The lack of automatic stabilizers in the EU level speaks for the
autonomy and elasticity of fiscal policy at the national level. The
Report of «One money, One market» underlined that:» the
stabilization role of fiscal policy at the national level is bound to
remain important in the EMU as long asymmetries persist». Fiscal
autonomy is warranted and its role as an adjustment instrument arises
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from the need to achieve external equilibrium (2 However, the effects
of reaction of fiscal policy and national budgets to cyclical fluctuation
may be limited (it depends on its elasticity to changes in output) and
relies on solidarity with partners transferring external aids during a
deep recession. Studies show that the impact of automatic stabilizers
is greater at the national level: the size of the public sector, tax system
progressiveness and unemployment benefits, sensitivity of
unemployment to cyclical fluctuation, and the share of the tax base to
economic cycle are greater at the national level.
Transferring to ECB competences regarding the emission of
national currency is connected also with the lost of seigniorage
revenue. Seigniorage (also called the inflation tax) is the well known
governmental practice connected with the ability to finance its
expenditures by printing money. Such a financing of budget deficit
through the issuance of low interest debt had been in past main cause
of major inflationary crisis. A tax system is rarely neutral with respect
to inflation, and higher taxation follows usually higher inflation.
According to the theory of optimal public finance, if the marginal cost
of rising revenue by increasing taxes exceeds the marginal cost of
raising it by seigniorage, the optimal policy is to reduce taxes and to
increase inflation (3). Seigniorage was an important source of
government revenues for some Mediterranean countries suffering high
inflation before joining the euro area ( above 1 % of GDP in Italy and
Spain, more than 2 % of GDP in Portugal Greece,which had inflation
rate of about 10 % in Portugal and 15 % in Greece .
The loss of the exchange rate mechanism may bring about a
balance of payment disequilibrium among partners countries of
monetary union. After ten years of functioning of euro area appeared
to have two group of member countries : those with trade surplus
(Germany, Holland, Austria, Belgium) and those with trade deficit
(France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece). In 2011 the balance of
payments in relations to GDP was for those countries as follows:
Germany + 4.6 %, Netherlands + 6.8 %, Austria + 3.5 %, Belgium +2.
0 % and in France — 3.4 %, Italy -2.4 %, Spain -3.8 %, Portugal -8
%. In Ireland balance of payment was negative in 2010 — 1.1 and
positive in 2011 + 1.5. The countries with a positive balance of
payments represented 39 % of all the euro area population and 44.9 %
of the euro area GDP, while the countries with a trade deficit
represented 61 % of the euro area population and 55.1 % of the euro
area GDP. The different tendency of productivity and wages growth
caused some kind of distortion in the competitiveness among member
states. In 1999 — 2007 years the wages grew on average 14 % in the
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euro area, While in Germany wages grew by only 2 %, they grew by
17 % in France, by 23 % in Italy and by 26 % in Spain The difference
in the cost of production contributed to the expansion of German
industry on the European Single Market and the growth of its trade
surplus, because Germany used strategy of wage restraint to combat
the stagnation of the economy. On the other hand, France lost its
competitive position in relation with Germany and became more
deindustrialized economy, in which only 12 % of GDP was produced
in industry sector (4 ).
Thus far the experiences of euro area show that it is not
asymmetrical shocks that matter the most, but rather differences in
competitiveness, wages and productivity growth between members
countries. Long term growth differences result in external imbalances
among members countries and raising the question whether monetary
union can withstand national differences in productivity growth. A
monetary equilibrium element can be achieved in the euro area in the
process of long term convergence. There is proposed new threshold
indicator of 3 % as being acceptable to be enforced by a fine to 0.1 of
GDP, but it seems that it would be difficult to execute in converging
partners with strong investment needs (5 ). The necessary element of
this convergence processes is that the real wages in less developed
members states increase less than productivity growth could allow.
However Greece, Spain and Portugal experienced a substantial
acceleration of real wage growth after entering the monetary union.
The ESCB uses the short- term interest rates to conduct monetary
policy. In order to finance external and internal deficit the European
System of Central Bank (ESCB) has the central position in the
member states of euro area. Like other central banks the ECB has
monopoly on the supply of cash and control short term rates. It should
be noted that in the euro area system, the common currency in
circulation is just 9 per cent of broad money (M3). The ESCB finance
flows via credits by the euro real — time settlement system countries
with external trade deficit receive financing from abroad from the
ECB and central banks of partners countries. There are debtor central
banks in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, and creditor’s central
banks in such countries as Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands,
Finland, and Austria. The central banks of the debtor countries act
also as the lender of last resort to country’s commercial banks and
lends against discounted public debt. Because of the internal payments
disequilibrium huge assets and liability have been transferred among
the national central banks with the Bundesbank as the dominant
creditor. Nevertheless, when the European Central Bank financed
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commercial and investment banks in the form of « quantitative
easing» with loans at a low 0.5 % interest rate, it could act also in
favour to finance potentially solvent partners and keep calm on the
financial markets. The ECB implements quantitative easing by
purchasing financial assets from banks with newly created money,
that increases their excess reserves. These reserves can be used to
credit real economy, as well as to buy bonds. Slightly more inflation,
and a depreciation of the euro and would be a cost of higher growth
and debt reduction and better way to overcome crises then the
deflationary policies of highly indebness partners.
However, in this system the ECB is not acting such efficiently like
for example the Bank of England -lender of last resort in its own
banking systems. There is not guarantee that the ECB’s ‘quantitative
easing and buyinhg debts on the secondary markets would produce
even in an indirect way lower debt in highly indebness countries.
Consequently the market view of the UK is less sceptical despite a
higher debt than in the euro area. The northern partners of the EU are
reluctant to use the ECB as the lender of last resort even on the
secondary markets and argue for austerity plans in high indebtedness
countries. Germany especially worries that if the ECB buys
governments bonds that will eventually be the cause inflation. On 21
December 20011 the ECB provided 489 billion low cost three years
credits to European banks known as long- term refinancing operation
and next in February 2012 additional 500 billion. The total assets of
ECB increased to 3.02 trillion euro — about 1/3 of the GDP of euro
area members countries. The ECB credits were seen as a kind of
backdoor way of supporting government fiscal policy and debt
servicing. Some European authorities had hoped, that the banks would
use the funds to buy to purchase high — yielding governed bonds, but
they are not very willing to invest liquidity in bonds and come back
partly to ECB account. (6 ). This backdoor way of financing debtor
countries by ESCB cannot of course continue for very long. In the
long run the only way for the debtor countries to go out from crisis is
to support to equilibrating of the external balance and to return to
situation, where the private sectors finances both bank and the
governments.
2. Reform of the euro area system
The interest payments for some countries constituted such an
important part of GDP that it is often very difficult to pay them back.
The high interet rates in euro area might come also from the
competition between European bonds and American bonds. Chairman
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of the Vatican bank IOR shared the opinion that United States was
behind the sovereign debt crisis in euro area. If euro area tried to
privatized the public debt, the US increased public debt to the markets
from 60 % of the GDP to almost 100 % of the GDP, those same
markets that before bought public debt from other countries. This led
to the replacement of a good part of euro area partners public debt by
less riskier American debts. Hence the result are portolios with more
American bonds and less European bonds that have to offer higher
rates to be sell. In order to resolve the debt problems in the euro area
and to save the monetary union from future debts crisis necessary
steps must be taken towards not only enforcement of the Maastricht
criteria, but also toward creating an effective financial aids
mechanism. There are three methods to lower interest rates on bonds
issues by some coountries in short time: 1. direct bonds purchases
through the ECB; 2. a Eurobonds; or. 3 by financial aids.
A country experiencing a budget deficit due to servincing a high
interest on bonds would have great leverage on the partner countries
and their strong financial integration may speak for bailing out
defaulting governments. Hence the present crisis demonstrated to the
EU member countries the need to accumulate the common resources
for emergency transfers to partner countries with debts and balance of
payments problems. As an effect of the financial crisis the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) has been set up in the EU to
provide temporary financial assistance to member states. The 440
billion euro participation of the euro area members was a part a wider
safety program with the IMF that was worth up to 750 billion. The
amount sovereign bonds, that need to be issued to service public debt
in the euro area is estimated to reach 794 billion euro in 2012 (7 ). The
EFSF becomes a kind of regional Monetary Fund; as such it has
gained new powers: to make short term loans, to provide funds to
recapitalize banks and in exceptional circumstances even buy back the
governments debts. (8 ). The access to EFSF aids is tied to strict
conditionality of a rigid austerity program and budget control.
Hovewer taking into consideration the potential for really large- scale
lending, the capital accumulated in the EFSF seems to be too small for
the tasks. The EFSF must have in the disposition fund that, if
necessary lend members states sufficient sum of money to avoid
market borrowing at the high rates. The mechanism of financial
stability acts to extend loans, for bank recapitalization and for buying
bonds in the primary and secondary market. The member states
unable to sell bonds at acceptable markets rates may apply for buying
them by EFSF. The mechanism of European Financial Stability
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Facility seemed to be only little substitute of European Monetary
Fund: as a temporary emergency facility it is going to be closed down
on June 2013 ( 9 ). From 2013 onwards it will be replaced the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). It seems that in the long term
the EU ought to establish some kind of European Monetary Found,
that would be the cornerstone of the measure formulated to deal with
budgetary and euro crises in the EU.
The idea of the European Monetary Fund is not new: after the first
oil shock a Community introduced borrowing and lending facilities
for balance — of — payments support. The first loan for member
countries, whose balance of payments had been upset were granted in
1976. The Council increased the volume of borrowing to 16 billion
ecu and by 31 December 2000 all borrowing had been repaid ( 10 ).
From 1979 to 1991 European Monetary Cooperation Fund ( EMCF )
existed in the framework of European Monetary System to make
intervention as necessary to defend currencies in the system. The
European Monetary Cooperation Fund accumulated 20 % of reserves
of member states to enable countries with weak currencies to borrow
in order to avoid devaluation behind fixed brand and long term credits
to finance structural reforms. It seems that to be effective the EFSF
must follow the example of European Monetary Cooperation Fund
and establish for itself a similar function in providing the member
countries with short term and long term credit. The European
Monetary Cooperation Fund acted in an efficient way to support the
ecu and to stabilize the money taking part in the ecu system by market
intervention. The mechanism of the European Monetary System
comprises three categories of aids: 1 very short term facilities (from
one to two months to fight with negative effects of speculative capital
flows; 2. short term support (from three to six months) to cope with
balance of payments difficulties; 3. medium term loans (from six
months to several years) to ease the restructuring of the economy.
(11). The proposed types of loans of the EFSF have accumulated less
capital than the EMCF and lack of a component, that is devoted to
restructuring of the economy. The loans are subject to rather strict
conditions and do not acting in such automatic way as in the European
Monetary System.
The limited effects of intervention of the EFSF on financial market
speak for application the other methods to resolve the euro area crisis:
the ECB intervenation, banking and fiscal union among partners with
issuing the common bonds. The ECB intervention may have lead to
stabilization in financial market, but it seems that to stabilize them
permanently, the level of intervention ought to be high. It may also
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not only lying on the strategy of «quantitative easing « but it also must
allow «qualitative easing» to change the assets kept by central banks.
Monetary stability in the euro area may be threatened, when if in one
or more members states the budgetary situation could lead to default.
Default in one member country could have spillover effects and
negative impacts on the other member states ability to pay their debts
as well threaten the part of banking sector in the euro- area, that keeps
the public debts of defaulting country. In connection with difficult
situation in banking sector the European Commission proposed
banking union among partner countries that would create a common
banking supervision and guarantee deposit throughout the euro area.
To this goal a common rescue fund is envisaged to directly
recapitalise banks. The banking union would force discipline on
financial sector by passing rules saying that banks must give reserve
for the bonds of states with large deficit.The simple way to resolve the
debt problems would be of course possibility to bail out the debtor
country debt with ECB money. However, the Maastricht Treaty
forbids the ECB from buying bonds on the primary market. If the US
Federal Reserve System or Bank of England can function as the
lender of last resort, the ECB cannot. Some countries ruled out relying
on this intervention on primary markets arguing that it would increase
inflation rates and weaken the determination of indebted partners to
restrict budget deficit and public debt.
In 2012 President ECB Mario Dragi announced a plan called
:»Outright Monetary Transaction that means a quantum shifts in the
ECB activities against crisis. The ECB wades in alongside the rescue
funds purchasing bonds in unlimited quantities of highly indebted
countries to bring their interest down. The ECB intervention on the
secondary market cut borrowing costs for some EU member countries.
In the short run the euro area needs ECB bailout program to protect
member countries from contagion and monetary policy to promote
growth. An example of positive intervention on the secondary market
is the ECB decision in August 2011 to buy Italian and Spanish bonds.
Italian debt was huge assessed at 1.8 trillion euro, and ECB 2 billion
euro intervention had mainly psychological effect. This intervention
decreased the prices of Spanish and Italian 10 year’s bonds on the
financial market from more than 6.1 % to 5.3 % in Italy and from 6.0
% to 5.2 % in Spain.
3. Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy
However, to cure internal disequilibrium in euro area the structural
reform in partner countries as well as the institutional reforms in the
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EU are needed. The ECB intervention could not individually solve
single currency long term ill. The euro crisis that started in 2008 has
clearly shown that more attention has to be paid to common
governance in EMU, because economic coordination between partners
has not been strong enough to prevent macroeconomic and fiscal
imbalances within the euro area. Need for a coordination of budgetary
policy in EMU arises from growing economic integration and the
likely spillover effects, when budgetary policies in one member states
may have impact on the economies of other partner countries. Fiscal
discipline and more belt — tightening -in the opinion of Wyplosz-
increases the likelihood that the EU as a result of the euro crisis could
face lost decade in 2010 — 2020 like Japan experienced in the 1990
(12 ). Therefore countries with negative balance and high public debt
should adjust as well as countries with external surplus and budgetary
equilibrum. In the economic crisis some coutries — members of the
single market must assume the role of engine of economic growth.
The decrease of demand in one group of partners may be
recompenated by the public spending in the other countries. The
partners that assumes the role of «engine of economic growth « may
be the countries in which public finances are in equlibrum or close to
quilibrum. More public spending in one or few countries may have
positive impact by growth of import from partners carrying out the
policy of stabilization their public finances. There would be no
inflation pressure, if policy were rigtly coordinated among partners
and with monetary policy provided by the ECB.
Generally normative theory stresses the «shock absorber «role of
budget deficit and prescribes that government debt should be adjusted
over time to respond to exogenous shocks. However political
scientists outline several reasons why the political system could affect
national debt decisions. The weight that the government attaches to
the future is affected by two features of the political system: its
instability and its polarization. In the less developed countries more
unstable and polarized systems behave more myopically.
Disagreement among different decisions makers result in the
postponement of unpopular policies and accumulation of public debt.
The less likely a government is to be reappointed, the higher amount
borrowed is. A weak government unable to cut expenditures or raise
taxes treats public debt as a residual source of finance. Hence debt
reduction is not only a economic decision, but intrinsically related to
the working of the political system.
On the one hand governments finance budget deficits by increasing
public debt, on the other hand they collect taxes to pay interest to
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bondholders. When governments collect taxes to pay interest
payments, an excess burden is creates . The need to make the interest
payment on a large debt may also contribute to growth of inflation.
Since the EMU removes the possibility of adjusting the individual
interest rates in any country, the rise in interest rates can no longer be
limited to the country running a budget deficit. If governments sell
new bonds to pay off the holders of the old bonds the question arises
whether it is possible for goverments fail to make payments back and
like a business corporation to go bankrupt. It is frequently stated that a
government cannot go bankrupt because it has the competency to levy
taxes in whatever amounts are necessary to service the debt.
Furthermore, governments have also the power to print money at least
indirectly pressing central bank to create additional money to avoid
default. Growing inflation may decrease the value of circulating
public debts. However in the euro system the governments of member
states have lost their any influences on the ECB decision to supply
money. The central banks cannot also decrease the value of debts by
growth of domestic inflation, as that is limited by the ECB goal of
price stability and taken into consideration throughout the euro area.
Partners countries have become aware that the bail-out option of
exchange rate devaluation no longer exists. The extent means with
which reduce debt rest entirely on budget policy. Hence it seems that
for these reasons the probability of default for a highly indebted
country is higher among member states that are outside the euro area.
The theory of fiscal federalism points out, that fiscal responsibility
can be divided between the UE and the members states in the same
way as they are divided between national’s states and its regions.
There are two main economic arguments speaking for fiscal
federalism: 1. spillover effects (negative externalities) if actions
undertake in one country lead to inefficient outcomes in the partner
country; 2. increasing returns to scale when for example an anty
cyclical policy is more efficient when carried out on large scale. The
common exchange rate policy must be a part of this mix as well as the
surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances, and including
competitiveness divergences. There are also two main arguments for
retaining fiscal sovereignty with monetary union’ partner countries:
heterogity of preferences and information asymmetries. These
arguments indicate that national or regional governments are the best
suited to shape fiscal policy to regional preferences (13). ). Thus far
the EU initiative to improve economic governance seems to be
moderate and perhaps too late steps towards effective coordination.
The EU propositions take into account the second group of arguments
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to avoid and correct budgets deficit and public debts in fiscal policies
in member states. Governments also put stress on political controls of
EU institutions over deficit and debt development to be more strict
and automatic . The fear of the loss of sovereignty with regard to this
state of affairs comes from mingling two crucial aspects of fiscal
policy: structural and stabilization. Structural tax policy is mainly
microeconomic and can be decided upon at the national level.
However the income stabilization policy can be accomplished
effectively at the supranational level.
Overall, in the euro area macroeconomic stability is provided by
national budgetary policies, that perform a function as shock
absorbers in any single country. There are valid arguments for jointly
imposing discipline and budgetary stabilization coordination as well
as optimal budgetary spending in all area in the time of crisis. In
2010- 2013 most EU members faced the problems of excessive public
debts and had to increased taxes to speed up fiscal consolidation. Tax
consolidation is an important means to recover budgetary and external
trade equilibrium among partners in the euro area. However, in the
fully liberalized European capital market, the excessive growth of
taxes in one country may have negative externalities due to costs of
capital outflow. Lost of a tax base in one country, that reduces the
supply of that country’s public goods may be correlated to an increase
of the tax base in partners countries. Simulation conducted by the
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies shows, that the loss of
efficiency due to tax increase would be reduced if the tax rises in the
EU countries were to be coordinated in order to « internalize trade —
related spillover effects». So fiscal consolidation in the EU should be
arranged in coordinated manner as well as should be increases of
taxes and the types of taxes included ( better indirect taxes than direct
taxes ). The result of the analysis indicated that efficiency gains would
be potentially higher for VAT than labor taxes ( 14).
In the euro area no bail out clause implicitly assumes that a
member country could become insolvent. In the US the default of a
state is possible whenever lower level governments are in financial
trouble. Nevertheless the US federal system can print dollar to cover
debt but in euro area the ECB cannot. Several European governments
have put pressure on the ECB to greatly increase its purchases of
sovereign bonds, that they regard as a possible solution to the debt
crisis. It seems that in time of crisis the ECB may assume a more
active role to contain the euro area debt crisis, and under the
conditions to undertake the necessary reforms in highly indebted
countries. A loosening of ECB policy is connected also with a
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weakening of the euro as it dropped to low level of about 1.2 doll per
euro at the beginning of 2012. An economic rule of thumb explained
that a 10 % fall in the euro may boost export and economic growth of
about 1 % after six months, especially in export countries that are the
most sensitive to euro exchange rate. Moreover, all member countries
may accept a modestly higher overall inflation than the Maastricht
price stability goal allows rather than falling into a possible
deflationary spiral. Temporary money creation would not be
inflationary in a depressed economy and it would help to avoid high
employment and reduce public debt in some euro area countries. It
seems that the task of the ECB should be enlarged beyond only the
keeping an inflation down. The ECB should be also responsible for
financial stability and growth: if financial stability is paralyzed then
the growth will not come, so a better way to growth is through
«quantitative easing» that will recover financial stability. After ten
years of restrictive monetary policy it seems that temporary ECB
intervention would not destroy its reputation.
However the ECB cannot substitute for fiscal policy coordination in
euro area. Against the ECB indirect «hidden» fiscal transfer there are
propositions concerning the introduction of a eurobond to be issued by
a single euro area authority ( EBC or by European Investment Bank ).
Eurobonds placed on the market by the EU institutions are to convert a
share of national members countries debt to the Community. The
eurobonds may be also guaranteed by intergovernmental agreement, as
such they would gain more trust that bonds issued by the governments
of the member states. The bonds could be buying by foreign investors
and many of them are in favor to invest in eurobonds against national
bonds. Jean –Cluade Junncker — president of the Euro group and
Giulio Tremonti- Italian ministry of finance — proposed to issue euro
bonds represented up certain limit : to 40 % of the GDP of the EU for
maintaining not only the budgetary solidarity of members states, and
also serving of default and bailing out of the bonds of the member
states (15 ). There are also propositions to establish a system of
common issuance of bonds in a progressive and partial way up to a
maximum of 60 % of GDP. A conversion of debt up to 60 % of the
GDP from members countries to the EU would mean that their
remaining debt would be Maastricht compliant. The creation of
eurobonds may bring the lower interest rates and attract foreign capital
to invest in their emission, for example from China. It may mutalise
debt in the euro area and reduce the borrowing costs of such countries
like Spain or Italy. However issuing jointly backed euroobligations
would not make sense until the euro area reaches some kind of fiscal
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union. The eurobonds will functions correctly only, if they posses
sufficient sovereign economic policy power to ensure their credibility.
The benefits of a euroobligation relative to no bail out actions is
generally considered to be greater financial stability. The German
opposed eurobonds initiative, because of fears that weaker countries
could get free- ride on the stronger credit ratings of stronger partners.
Eurobonds may have higher rates then German bonds but less then in
the other countries. Germany afraid of a growth of interest rates and
raise expectations among market participants that eurobonds would
become the norm and a factor that could actually promote future crises.
Overall opponents of eurobonds underline the possibility of
mutualisation of some loses, excessive emissions and higher inflation in
the single market. Nevertheless euro area countries have not yet set out
a road map towards eurobonds and the partners countries are rather in
favor to of setting up euro area common bail-out funds, that would be
able to buy sovereign bonds.
Moreover, euro area needs a banking union with common banking
supervision. European banking union is proposed with common
capital requirements and supervision and deposit guarantee system
(DGS) with a goal to compensate bank deposit holders for failures of
individual bank. Integrated supervision of banks in the euro area is
necessary to ensure the application of common prudential rules. Such
supervision may reduce the probability of banks failure and prevent
the spreading of crisis throughout the whole EU. The banking union
should also minimise the cost of eventual bank failures and financial
intervention to citizens of member states. The current architecture of
European regulations provided incentives to buy governments debt
consider as «free of risk». For example, European banks were not
obliged to set aside additional reserves, when they bought
governments debt. Hence new rules has been proposed (Basel III
banking rules) that would be introduced in 2018 to hold capital
reserves to at least 3 % of all their holding. Parallel to this process is
the creation of a common fund to bail out failing banks and guarantee
deposit over the euro area. The credibility of any deposit guarantee
requires of course access to a solid financial backstop. A European
deposit insurance scheme could introduce the international dimension
to national deposit guarantee schemes for banks overseen by the
European supervision. So called banking union is a part of proposed
new economic governance of the euro area able to carry out a proper
financial policy for all member states.
Van Rompuy report in June 2012 mentioned four essential
building blocks of a genuine economic and monetary union that will
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have to be put in place over the next. In the view of report they offer a
coherent architecture for long- term stability and prosperity of EMU
and include:
1. An integrated financial mechanism with a view to ensure
financial stability, common supervision of banking at the European
level, resolve banks failures and guarantee customer deposit,;
2. An integrated budgetary framework to ensure sound fiscal
policy making in euro area. Such framework encompassing
coordination, joint decision- making, different forms of fiscal
solidarity, commensurate steps towards common debt issuance;
3. An integrated economic policy coordination at national and
European level to promote sustainable economic growth;
4. Democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision- making
within the EMU (16).
The common monetary policy must be joined more closely with
harmonized tax policies in the member states. Public spending
coordination cannot be concentrated only on the one country market
and political cycle, but must take into the consideration the spillover
effect on the partner countries. The Maastricht criteria should govern
without exception among the states and public finances should be
considered jointly when the deficit in one country may be
«equilibrated» by the surplus in partner country. Fiscal policy
coordination is needed to discourage free riding and to induce
governments to internalize the negative externalities. Uncoordinated
fiscal policies might drive up interest rates EU over the entire EU,
depressing capital formation, growing national debt and hampering
Europe’s international competitiveness (17). In the future it is only
under conditions of strict common fiscal policy that it would be
possible to enable the common borrowing for eurobonds. Common
emission of eurobonds in the framework of the EU budget equipped
with more resources and more harmonized taxes might avoid the
problems of financing of public debt and spreading in interest among
members states. Like in the European Monetary System one can also
envisage setting up a European Monetary Fund that is able to bail out
national’s debts and transfer stabilization aids from richer European
countries to the euro-zone periphery.
4. The evolution of euro area before accession of tranformation
countries.
The worst outcome for the highly indebted euro area member
countries would be to leave the euro area to accomplish devaluation of
their national currencies. The decision to leave by one, few many or
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even all the countries of the euro area should be based on the profits
and costs analysis regarding the economic effects imposed on his
economy and the whole European Single Market. A country can
withdraw from the EMU in order to be free to resort to debt
monetarization. To the extent that debt would be denominated at
home currency (instead of euro), this could alleviate a country’s
public finances. However, coming back to the home currency may be
connected not only with administrative costs of money exchange, but
also higher inflation, collapse of financial sector, a loss of credibility,
and corporate defaults and separation for years from capital market.
Negative effects would be felt as well in the euro area in the form of
higher inflation, and a drop of trade and investment. Sometimes the
example of Argentine has been evoked, which Argentina fell into
financial crisis in 1990 having fixed exchange rate of its peso to the
value of the US dollar. Argentine entered a spiral of external trade and
budget deficit until it devaluated the peso and restructured its public
debt. After devaluation and debt relief Argentine returned to the path
of economic growth. However a return to a free exchange rate by the
members of the euro area would be costly to the all single market. At
sum all the partners may lose: a devaluation of currencies of the
weaker members might accompany an appreciation of the currencies
of stronger partners (Germany, Austria, and Holland, Finland). After
that the regional policy may be reforming and diminished as well as
the common agricultural policy. Protection tendencies could arise and
the Schengen agreement could be dissolved. So a country that is
considering exiting the euro area should taking into consideration that
there may be little prospect that devaluation offers much and that
structural reforms may count for much more.
One can hardly imagine that the members of the current euro area
would accept as a solution such a leap backwards into completely freely
exchange rates. The cost of reintroducing a national currency seems to
be much greater than leaving only a fixed exchange rate like Argentina
did. The introductory calculation estimated a decrease of at least 10 %
of GDP of the euro area in the case of dissolvent. Daniel Gross shared
the opinion, that while Greece might ultimately require financial aids of
about 400 billion euro, allowing Greece to abandon euro would cut its
nominal GDP by at least half, making debt equivalent to 400 % of GDP
( 17 ). A breaks up of the euro area may turn out to be too costly in
comparison with deeper integration and fiscal union. The cost of
breaking up with the euro may be especially important for the small
open economy, because for these members internal reforms are better
alternative. According to the UBS assessment each Germany citizens
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will have to pay at least 1000 Euro to bail out Greece, Ireland and
Portugal’s debts,; hence the cost of an eventual bail out seems to be
lower, than the cost of an eventual break up of the euro area (18).For
example, Slovakia’s export oriented economy has recovered quickly
from the financial crisis. After two years of budget deficit at nearly 8 %
of GDP, the government cut spending and raised taxes to the level of
2.5 % of GDP. Belgium is another example of a country that has
successfully reduced its public debt. Once the most indebted country in
the EU ( with a ratio of debt at 134 % to GDP in 1993 ) Belgium
steadily reduced its debt to 84 % by 2007. Thus default is then
unnecessary, if sensible reforms are introduced.
The present crisis of the euro area shows, that euro as a currency
seems to be more an element of the economic union than an element
of the European Single Market. The single market may function with
euro and without the euro and the benefits deriving from the one
money for one the market are rather modest. In practice the size of the
cost of exchange rate instability suggest, that it is restrained obstacle
to trade development. By and large traders seem to be able to hedge
against the risks of exchange fluctuation. National currencies are in
the same way restrictive to foreign direct investments. However when
foreign investments are treated as alternatives to exports, some
investments may be encourages by the existence of currency risks.
According to the theory of optimal currency area the economic
benefits from one money for the single market are conditioned on
several assumptions. In asymmetric shocks members countries have at
their disposition two safety valves: elastic labor marker or fiscal
policy. Because the labor market in the EU is two times less elastic
than that in the US, in the euro area the burden of fighting against
crisis fall to the fiscal policies in the member states. Common fiscal
policy in the euro area may take the form of supranational fiscal
policies with a centralized budget or some part of it or through
coordination of fiscal policies in member states. A centralized budget
would be able to accomplish fiscal transfers from more to less
prosperous region and — in the opinion of P.Mortimer- Lee —
without them the prospects for EMU are rather gloomy ( 19 ).
Coordination adaption of common regulations, and harmonization of
national laws and rules, it may also lead to convergence of the target
variables of policy (20) The frontier of the EMU should be limited by
the possibility of conducting the effective coordination of fiscal and
monetary policy between member’s countries.
Therefore political factors of monetary union seem to be at as
important as economic factors. Some authors asserted even that the
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raison d’etre of monetary union was political rather than economics
and the success of monetary integration rests on political union, and
not on economic theories. (21). The euro was introduced not only to
enlarge economic profits from the single market, and also to speed up
European integration towards economic union. Before the
establishment of the euro area H. Tietmyer president of the
Bundesbank argued that after certain point economic integration
cannot realistically be expected to advance without the prospects of
progress in the field of politics (22). The transfer of an elementary
sovereign right such a monetary policy to the ECB is likely mark that
point. O.Issing shared the view that if it is to be workable at all
monetary union requires full political union ( 23). M. Wolf predicted
in 1996 that under the EMU there would be incentives for individual
governments to pursue deficit financing with the expectation that they
would be bailed out by the ECB. The greatest risk is that those
countries with initially high levels of public indebtedness might find
the effort of lowering public debt excessively painful. This risk would
be reflected in high euro interest rate (24). The latest financial crises
have also convinced European politicians to attempt closer political
union. During a meeting in Strasbourg in 2011 even German
chancellor A. Merkel fixed on the long term goal of fiscal union.
Merkel underlined that changes to the European Treaties are the only
way to restore confidence in the financial markets. (25). Some
politicians are aware that monetary union requires the relinquishment
much of the budgetary sovereignty held by member states.
Although the stable currency and low interest rates have been
helpful to the European Single Market, more needs to be done to
ensure better governance in the euro area to improve budgetary
coordination or even partial budgetary unification. The common
monetary policy seems to be more an element of economic union than
a single market and that the latest crises have showed that in the futher
transfers of national policy sovereignty from the member states to
supranational organs is necessary so that the monetary as in fiscal
policies may be better coordinated, as they must be properly
functioning of a currency union. A key reason why a single currency
works in the US and does not work so efficiently in the EU is the
insulation provided by the federal fiscal system. Managing a large
monetary union should be straightforward like in the Federal State.
Monetary policy requires the Central Bank to take monetary decisions
in the name of all members countries as well as manage the
substantial union wide budget to transfer income from more
successful parts to the less successful countries and regions.
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Government borrowing should operate through a single union wide
bond market with borrowing determined by a decisive central
authority. In the US Federal Reserve manages of the union’s monetary
policy via a single bond market with borrowing belonging to the
institutions of the federal states, while the borrowing of states and
municipalities is constrained due to their inability to monetize their
debt. After war of independence the USA confronted the same
problems with the debts incurred by the the states as euro area did and
had resolved it by assuming these debts issuing new federal debts.
Because of the need to bailout of debt in some countries, central
control over budget deficit seems to be necessary. The EU moved
towards the EMU without giving it the ability to bail out public debts
of partner countries and make transfers between them because of the
limited size of its budget. Therefore, in the period of economic crisis a
new fiscal pact for economic convergence in the EU is need and it
must complement the current plans of austerity measures. Cohesion
policy and structural funds that concentrate their activities on income
convergence between partners and their regions, should reoriented
their policy also to include the stabilization goals. The European
Investment Bank may deploy funds to match investments in countries
undergoing structural reforms. Furthermore the ECB should be more
proactive in buying the public debts of partner countries. The ECB
can assist the banking sector in reforming countries and operates on
the market to bail out countries debt. In the view of such grow of debt
and the rise of interest rates in some euro area countries, the question
arises whether part of the countries will be able to pay back their debts
and manage to deliver on both fiscal disciplines and economic
recovery. To put it another way will Germany and other northern
members of the UE southern countries by bail out and reschedule their
debts and by offering them palliatives such as reduced interest rates
for emergency loans. The financial crises in 2008 -2013 showed that
the euro area institutional system is inherently fragile. Due to the
economic and financial interlink among the member countries the
fragility of one or a few is becoming fragility of all the partners.
The financial crises have exposed the weakness of the Maastricht
Treaty and further integration seems to be the solution to the current
crisis in the euro area. The crises revealed that monetary integration
has crossed the Rubicon towards more harmonized economic policy.
Monetary integration simply does not work without further tax
integration policies among member states. Countries of the euro area
fell into debt crises relatively easily despite Maastricht conversions
criteria and Stability Pact. To make the convergence criteria more
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obligatory partner countries have agreed to introduce more strict debt
and deficit rules to be included in the law of member states, but there
is no guarantee that debt crises will not happen again. To escape from
the current crisis and prevent the future one, there is no alternative,
but to elaborate a proper policy mix between monetary policy and
fiscal policy. Now in the euro area there is a combination of
decentralized national fiscal policy with rather strict monetary policy.
Budgetary policy in the euro area works primarily as an absorption
function at the national level, and less at establishing of an optimal
budgetary spending for entirel EMU. The reforms before futher EMU’
enlargement should institute more strict and coordinated fiscal policy
and more proper monetary policy taking into consideration financial
stability and economic growth. It is not a question of introducing one
or other new instruments, because one instrument can be substituted
by another. Rather this is a new viable institutional arrangement
empowered to carry out rational economic policy. Monetary union
should lead to fiscal union and fiscal union to banking union with
deposit insurance in the EU. A banking union in euro area would
probably be unworkable unless accompanied by a full fiscal union.
Some economists thinks that the euro can be saving only by stronger
economic union among member states. The European Commision
even indicate necessity to establish of some kind of common
economic government able to take up economic decisions and
formulate common economic policy. The EU must put in place some
form of economic government, that is able to coordinate fiscal
policies with monetary policy of the ECB. The best chances for
economic recovery involves governments working together to
increase demand and to augment business confidence. No institutional
reforms in the euro area means acceptance of internal fragility and rise
a danger of stopping futher enlargement. Of course government debt
and the potential for default cannot be linked only to the euro and
functions of the ECB . In a federal state like the US nobody linked the
potential default of one state to the dollar functioning as a legal
tender. For example during a recent budgetary crisis the State of
Illinois simply stopped paying 5 billion of its bills, California issued
vouchers for wage payments. In both states there were cuts in public
services. However, nobody envisaged a bail out financed solely by the
other US states nor an exit from monetary union. An analysis of the
institutional manner in which the US deals with the crisis reveals
federal country wide prudential rules for banks and Federal Reserve
System as a lender of last resort (26). The central budget in the USA
also helps states by automatic stabilizers when economic crisis begin.
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Moreover, in the US there is a dialogue between the Federal Reserve
and President of the US, such a dialogue does not exist in the euro
area neither between the ECB and the European Commission nor
between the ECB and goverments of members states (27).
Thus far we do not know precisely what the economic benefits and
costs of closer economic union and coordinated economic policies are.
Coordination commits partners to agreement on the actions needed to
accomplish a coherent policy for the euro area. The basis for the
coordination coming from the fact that in euro area under the
Maastricht Treaty ( given the openness of the European economies ),
no member country alone has an incentive to expand demand issuing
fiscal policy. Because a large part of the benefits of increased growth
and employment would accrue to its neighbours and most cost of a
deterioration of balance of payment would fall on the country itself, a
country withstand to assume a role of locomotive of economic
growth. So if every country decides on its fiscal policy independently,
taking into account only its own interest, euro area fiscal policy would
be on average deflationary. A coordinated expansion by all member
countries of euro area would therefore have a much bigger positive
impact on growth and employment.
Because banking sector bears the huge costs of the euro crisis first
of all there is also a need of coordination program in banking to
recaptalise some banks in differente partners to make them slovent.
European banking union is proposed with common common capital
requirements and supervision and deposit quarantee system ( DGS )
with a goal to compensate bank deposit holders for failures of
individual bank. Governments could also do much to coordinate
economic policies so as to better align spending and taxing .These
coordination can help to avoid of contradictory means and negative
externalities, and to provide proper income stabilization policy for all
euro area. In order to coordinate effectively the fiscal policies among
members states the credible text plans for budgetary projects should be
drawn and based on independent growth forecasts and checked by»
independent budgetary council». To this goal it is necessary to
normalize and harmonise presentation methods concerning national
budget, that partners budget can be aggregated to establish a
consolidated euro area budget( local and social finances included ). The
coordination should be served by Eurostat as an independent European
statistics agency combined network of National Statistics Agencies(28),
does not necessarily mean total unification of all national budgets into
one supranational budget. It may be linked with some further
harmonization of taxes, like direct taxes for enterprises at a minimum
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level of 18- 20 % . Accumulation of more common financial resources
may be linked to EU budget or more resources may be transferred to
the European Financial Stability Facility ( later to European Stability
Mechanism ). Without at least partly mutualisation of partner debt and a
larger bail- out funds ( for example in the form European Redemption
Fund ) fundamentally solvent countries might be forced into financial
crisis on an occasion of economic downturn. According to Ch. Saint-
Etiene the enlarged EU budget able assume new functions might be
composed from one third of taxes levied on firms, 0.5 % from the value
added tax, 1 % on all revenue and 2 % on all consumption spending in
the euro are. The enlarged EU budget or stability mechanism would
then be able to absorb effectively asymmetric shocks in the euro area
before they affected all partner countries. It can help with adjustment
problems in the monetary union, if the common budget is equipped
with common resources so that should a arise occasion and funds must
be transferred, the transfer can be organized. Moreover, coordinated
fiscal policy might include not only some fiscal standards, and also
common rules concerning spending on the occasion of an economic
downturn. Coordinated budgetary spending should serve first and
foremost the strategic growth policy of the members states and support
mainly: research and development, creation of the new technology and
products, energy policy, and development of infrastructure, finance a
European Venture Capital Fund for small and medium firms etc. (29).
In order to finance such growth under the European economic recovery
programme and to stabilize euro area debt the EU may issue also its
own bonds up to 60 % of partner’s GDP rather than only national bonds
denominated in euro. Euro bonds proposition seems to be
complementary initiative to policy coordination, as they can bring the
best effects in the framework of fiscal union. President of ECB Dragi
told that Euro bonds make sens when we have a fiscal union, otherwise
they don’t make sens. European Council President Herman Van
Rompuy stated also that Eurobond could be considered only after a new
stage in the EU’s fiscal and economic integration. (30).
As the debt crisis in the euro area is getting worse initial condition
to combat the crisis is reducing the public debt. It is rather unrealistic
in the short term to reduce significantly government debt in the euro
area through the budgetary surplus in member countries. It is possible
to attain this goal by classic methods: a).debt restructuring) debt
forgiveness or c). Debt monetarisiation. Debt restructuring is to be
deep enough to bring the debt to 60 % of GDP of member states. This
scale reduction will inevitably lead to a banking crisis that would
require government intervention and more public debt. Many
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government resources will be needed to recapitalize the bank after the
debt restructuring. The main potential pool of money the European
Stability Mechanism that should eventually reach the firepower of the
500 billion euro. If one compare capital of the European Stabilisation
Mechanism with the total debt crisis countries- Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Italy and Spain, which account for about 3.75 trillion euro, it
is obvious that the resources of the European Stability Mechanism is
nowhere near big enough to cope with a series of debt consolidation:
b) in the case of debt forgiveness the mechanism of the Paris Club
could be created to forgive part of the debts of euro area member
countries. If we assume that all other euro area countries to forgive
quarter debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal Italy, Spain and France, this
will be write of debt forgiven countries, that is about 1.2 trillion euro
— about 30 % of GDP . On the other hand if Germany covers these
losses, the national debt would reach about 110 % of its GDP. The
money used for debt forgiveness seems to be so huge that the Paris
club’ solution seems possible only for a small member country of euro
area like Greece. 3 Debt monetization The central bank acts often as a
lender of last resort. De Grauwe made an observation that the cause of
the debt crisis in the euro area would be limited if the markets do not
believe that the ECB was ready to move public debt (31).
Monetization of debt has a bad reputation because often lead to
galloping inflation. This inflationary policy mans that all member
states of euro area (Germany included) will share losses inherent in
the debt restructuring. So it seems that debt monetarisation policy is
not possible to be executed in euro area because EBC cannot buy
bonds on the primary market (only on the secondary market), when
the debts matures, the countries would have to pay interest and
principles to ECB, that means there will be transfer in the wrong
direction from the country being helped to help countries.
To combat excessive public debt it is also possible to sale of states
assets. It seems possible for governments with a large national debt to
sell some of its assets and use the proceeds to buy back their bonds.
This operation will reduce payments of interest of debts and their
exposure to volatile market. Sale of assets can bring a lot of really
gross debt decreased by a significant amount. For the euro area as a
whole the states assets amount to about 3 % of GDP. OECD estimates
serious value of net debt that can be used to recover the valuation of
assets (calculated as gross less net public debt). For Greece the
reduction of debts due to selling public assists might reach the level of
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In the short run the euro area needs more investments, slower
fiscal adjustment, looser monetary policy to promote growth and a
more financial support to protect member countries from contagion. In
the long euro area need structural and institutional reforms.For the
future development of Europe Agenda 2012 calls for greater
cooperation between EU partners regarding the quality of public
spending and to get this positive synergies the euro area finances
ministers will have to turn budgets around to stimulate spending and
potential growth. All proposed steps against euro crisis are mutually
collarated: monetary integration requires stricker fiscal integration,
fiscal integration requires banking union but baniking union is going
to to require some form of a political union. This way the debt crisis
in the euro area may present an opportunity to renewed the strength of
European institutions. It was often repeated during previous crises in
the EU that integration process in Europe cannot be stopped. It is like
a snowball at the top of a large hill or like riding the bicycle, that we
must always pedal, new crises leading to new solutions and more
intensive integration among members states. It seems that it is in the
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vital interest of Poland and the other transformation countries is to
join only a strong euro area with good governance and a fully fledged
mechanism managing it, that is able to effectively carry out monetary
as well as fiscal policy and more automatically overcome
unequlibrum and eventual financial and economic shocks. Otherwise,
the attractiveness of monetary union beyond the European Single
Market (which brought for example Poland the most integration
profits) seems to be limited.
In the long run Poland and other transformatione economies have
the opportunity to reach the other benefits from membership in the
integration processes. As for transformation economies joining the
euro- area the decision to do should be based not only on the actual
economic profits and costs of monetary union, but also on the ability
and willingness of the euro area to accomplish necessary reforms.
Now central European countries may expect rather moderate
economic profits to come from euro. The benefits for Poland and
other transformation economies from eventual accession into euro
area seem to be less than those from single market and structural
policies. New EU member countries gets most of its integration
profits from free trade and investment flows, Structural Funds and
direct aids to agriculture. The euro currency can bring transformation
economies all the benefits of a single market, but only under the
conditions that can be created by a full-fledged economic union. The
standard analysis shows that benefits for transformation economies
would be comparable to those realized upon the elimination of non-
tariffs barriers under the single market program and would give an
additional moderate impulse up to 0.5 % — 1 % to economic growth.
This additional growth would come mainly from: intensification of
trade with the EU partners, increase in competition, elimination of risk
in rate of exchange and transaction costs, increase in the attractiveness
of the market for international investments, new possibilities for
economic institutions to finance their activities. Although short term
benefits from accession to the euro area may prevail over economic
costs it should be stressed that in the long run higher profits depend
upon further reforms inside the EU and in transformation economies.
Without institutional reforms, dynamic growth in investment and
productivity, and a more elastic labour market, the EMU will lose
competitive position in the long run. The importance of costs bearing
from eventual functioning of common currency in transformation
economies would be also related with further structural changes in the
economy, growth of productivity and reforms of the labour market.
The economic costs may occur in the long run that is related with the
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fact that economic structure of many the central European economies
economy are not perfectly similar to the EU core countries and low
flexibility of wages.
The crisis in euro area is writing a new chapter in the history of the
European integration: stop monetary integration in the present form or
to proceeds to reform EMU. To save the euro more efforts has to be
paid to common governance in EMU, because common institutions
have not been strong enough to prevent macroeconomic and fiscal
imbalances within the euro area. It is obvious that the federal
government is better equipped with automatic mechanisms to fight
against asymmetric shocks then euro area. In the EU there are neither
tax that are paid directly to the common budget nor unemployment
fees that are transferred from common budget to depressed regions.
The lack of automatic stabilizers mechanisms similar to those of the
federal state unable partner countries handling crisis aids
automatically. The question is how to govern the euro area in crisis
without commitment to political union, when the situation requires the
use state like tools to respond. Further integration of financial
resources and common economic decisions seems to be possible
solution for the euro area. Functioning institutional structure of the
EU has created inconsistency between monetary and fiscal policies
and suboptimal economic outcomes. These two most important
economic policies should act in harmony to save the partners
countries equilibrium and to promote economic growth. A completely
centralized monetary policy puts more weight on fiscal policy in
member states to counteract economic disturbances. However,
national fiscal policies did not fully perform the functions neither
shock absorber nor optimal budgetary spending. The Maastricht
Treaty has not provided the necessary institutional structure for the
accumulation of common resources with a view to redistribution goal
and proper coordination a common monetary policy with completely
disintegrated fiscal policies. Fiscal policies within the euro area have
tried to replace the stabilizing role of monetary policy, but they have
turned out to be imperfect substitutes, when it comes to resolving
macroeconomic imbalances. Budgetary policies in the euro area aim
primarily at absorption function at the national level, but less optimal
budgetary spending for all EMU. Reinforced fiscal coordination and
ex ante confirmation of nationals budget deficit would make more
effective fiscal and monetary policy possible. More fiscal
coordination should be connected with more fiscal discipline between
partners. It seems that the euro area must become a more tight fiscal
union with more transfer payments used temporarily to build up
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automatic stabilizers to get out quickly from economic crises before
futher enlargement towards new member countries. The need for
larger, perhaps separate budget for euro area arises also from the loss
of the exchange rate instruments in member countries. Need for a
coordination of budgetary policy in EMU arises from growing
economic integration and the likely spillover effects, when budgetary
policies in one member states may have impact on the economies of
other partner countries.
The EU’ progress towards a more integrated structure is probably
the best answer to the debt crisis in the partner countries. Further
integration of economic policies with a view to promote growth
seems to be the best solution to overcome the debt crisis. The euro
project deserves more institutional design and better economic
governance because the single money cannot exist anymore without
good governance and proper mix of monetary policy and fiscal
policy at the European level. The important issue is not only fiscal
policy, but also more active role of ECB: one or several new
instruments would serve the ECB’ goals to be reoriented more to
stabilize economies of member states, and not only keeping inflation
down. The ECB must assume the role of lender of last resort towards
the high indebted countries at least at the secondary market. The
ECB cannot of course substitute for fiscal integration and be a
subject of moral hazard. Both policies must be properly coordinated
to stimulate growth and avoid unbalances. To overcome the debt
crises Europe needs a truly comprehensive package; banking union
with common deposit guarantee system, fiscal union with budget
enable the transfer of savings between members with surpluses to
members in deficit and furthermore changing the priorities of ECB
also seems also necessary to handle the crisis. The obvious solution
to euro area crisis is to have a banking union, a fiscal union and a
political union together. All proposed steps against crisis in euro
area collateral and one steps followed the other: monetary
integration requires sticker fiscal integration, fiscal integration
requires banking union but fiscal and banking union are going to
require some form of a political union. Because banking sector bears
the huge costs of the crisis in euro area there is a need of centralised
resolution and supervision mechanism as well as of new funds to
deal with liquidity problems to recapitalise some banks in different
partners. In the long run a country and its banking sector cannot
recover without macroeconomic stability and economic growth. It is
not a question of a single instrument that can be substituted for
another. The euro can disseminate all the benefits from single
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market for transformation economies only under conditions of the
full economic union. One economic policy, one money explains
more than one money, one market.
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Abstract As one of the greatest metropolises in China, Shanghai
has been playing a critical role in China’s economic development.
With the launching of its construction of «Big Four Centers», namely
the Shanghai International Economic Center, the International
Financial Center, the International Trade Center and the International
Shipping Center, Shanghai is now having its industrial structures
being adjusted and bettering the proportion between its secondary and
tertiary industries. Meanwhile, Shanghai is also making full use of the
«post-Expo» economic effect, focusing on constructing the Free Trade
Zone, attracting high quality foreign investment, building its brand
new international image, and enhancing its urban economic
competitiveness.
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